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ABSTRACT 
Web service-oriented architecture (WSOA) is a promising 
paradigm for future software development. Necessary 
identity management (IdM) architectures for WSOA are 
just being prepared to enable fine-grained access control. 
With the loose coupling of Web services with cross-
cutting identity services the question arises how to 
develop access control policies for Web services. In this 
paper we present a model-driven approach defining 
access control policies which are independent from the 
IdM architecture to which they are later applied. 
Therefore we develop a platform-independent access 
control model for WSOA and derive a platform-specific 
model from a given IdM product. We show how to map 
both models to a concrete language. Access control 
policies are then defined using our platform-independent 
language and transformed to platform-specific policies 
using explicitly defined transformation rules. We present 
a case study that applies our approach. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Currently, most enterprises try to align their business 
processes with the supporting IT by migrating towards 
Web service-oriented architecture (WSOA) [1]. Besides 
the development of WSOA’s core concerns (cf. to 
separation of concerns [2]) there are cross-cutting 
concerns that have to be addressed before being able to go 
productive with WSOA, a central one is enabling security, 
especially access control [3]. Access control consists of 
authentication and authorization verification. 
Authorization verifications are made by the IdM 
architecture, typically at a component called policy 
decision point (PDP) and are enforced by a component 
called policy enforcement point (PEP). We presented an 
architectural blueprint of a WSOA-aware IdM 
architecture in [4]. 
 
In this paper we build upon our conceptual access control 
metamodel for WSOA presented in [5] and develop a 
domain-specific language called Web Services Access 
Control Markup Language (WSACML). While our 
conceptual access control metamodel defines the sets and 
relations necessary for the decision on authorization 
verification requests, WSACML defines an appurtenant 
language for the expression of such policies. WSACML 
defines the platform-independent model (PIM) in the 
context of OMG’s model-driven architecture (MDA) [6] 
considering the IdM product as the exchangeable 
platform. The goal is that during Web service 
development its security aspects can be defined in 
parallel. Policies can then be modeled independently from 
the IdM architecture that will be used at service runtime. 
When deploying the Web service, its policy is 
transformed conforming to the policy metamodel of the 
given IdM product and deployed there. This allows Web 
service developers to reduce dependencies towards an 
IdM product and to incorporate IdM as a loosely-coupled 
infrastructural service. 
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Figure 1. Transformation of Access Control Policies 
 
 
The contributions of this paper are: 
 
1. We define a policy model for Web service-oriented 
architecture that is platform-independent from a given 
IdM product and we present a concrete language which 
applies this model called Web Services Access Control 
Markup Language (WSACML). 
 
2. We show how to derive a platform-specific policy 
model of an existing IdM product and how to link these 
two models using explicitly defined transformation 
rules. This allows for a model-driven development 
starting with platform-independent policies. 
632-069 165
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 gives the 
background on access control and model-driven 
development and discusses related work. In section 3 we 
present WSACML as a platform-independent access 
control policy language for Web services. In section 4 we 
show how to derive a platform-specific policy metamodel 
of a state-of-the-art IdM product and how to couple it 
with the platform-independent one. In section 5 our 
approach is applied practically in a case study. A 
conclusion and an outlook on our future work in this area 
close the body of the paper. 
 
2.  Background and Related Work 
 
2.1  Access Control Models 
 
The purpose of access control models is to define sets and 
relations for the definition of authorization statements 
which are used to make access control decisions. The core 
of access control models is about the definition of the so-
called subject/object-relation [7] which formally models 
an active subject for getting access to a protected object. 
Role-based access control (RBAC) [8] introduces the role 
element as an indirection between subjects and objects. 
Subjects are assigned to (business) roles and authorization 
is not granted to individuals but to roles which eases 
administration. 
 
An enhancement of RBAC for Web services is introduced 
in [9] featuring attribute-based access control (ABAC). It 
allows for complete decoupling of subjects and objects. 
Both are characterized by attributes, e.g. their metadata. 
Policies very abstractly define general authorization 
statements. While this approach offers much flexibility, 
the problems not solved yet are about a concrete policy 
language which needs to be very precise to handle this 
independence in the subject/object-relation. The 
decoupling of policies from the objects to be protected 
adds complexity as policy matching algorithms are 
needed which are not introduced in [9]. A policy decision 
point that is able to handle this flexibility has not been 
presented in this work either. 
 
The OASIS standard eXtensible Access Control Markup 
Language (XACML) [10] allows for modeling of 
platform-independent access control policies. XACML 
does not focus on the Web service domain but is a general 
policy language. It features the decoupling of access 
control policies from concrete objects using policy 
matching algorithms and a generalized way of 
characterizing subjects and objects using attributes. 
Focusing on WSOA, the object to be protected is the Web 
service operation defined by its signature in WSDL. Due 
to the granularity of a Web service operation it is not 
enough to only take care of its static aspects but the 
operation’s parameters that are sent during invocation 
must also be considered. XACML-compliant policy 
artifacts are voluminous due to XACML’s notable 
syntactical overhead, which hinders its usage for business 
process designers. IdM products setting up on generalized 
XACML-based access control policies are rather seldom 
at present. These characteristics do not favor XACML to 
be a suitable policy language handling platform-
independent analysis and design during Web service 
development. Considering model-driven development (cf. 
following section) it is to be positioned at PSM/PSC level. 
 
2.2  Model-Driven Policy Development 
 
Model-driven development is an approach to software 
development that focuses on models and their 
transformations as primary engineering artifacts. OMG 
did a specification of this general approach called model-
driven architecture (MDA) [6]. The core elements are 
platform-independent models (PIM) and platform-specific 
models (PSM). The link between such two models is 
drawn by transformation rules, specified between 
elements of the respective metamodels. 
 
The early treatment of security and especially access 
control has evolved to be a critical factor in software 
development projects. The integration of specifying 
access control in Web service development processes still 
lacks a standardized approach. Thinking of model-driven 
development of access control policies for the Web 
services domain, a domain-specific but platform-
independent policy language is a necessary prerequisite. 
Well-established security infrastructures are already in 
use for protecting traditional Web applications, so it is 
reasonable to integrate them into the Web services world. 
Compliance requirements and therefore the explicit 
definition of security aspects are drivers for refactoring 
existing platform-specific policies to platform-
independent ones making them understandable in a better 
way for business analysts. 
 
A contribution to model-driven security is given in [11]. 
To integrate access control aspects into the Web services 
development process the authors defined an OCL-like 
grammar [12] for modeling authorization knowledge and 
developed a transformation tool which accepts this 
grammar for the generation of platform-independent 
XACML-compliant policies. They suggest attaching the 
authorization knowledge during software design phase to 
interface models. Proceeding to implementation phases 
they transform this knowledge into XACML-compliant 
policies. They suggest employing XACML as target 
platform but neglect the integration of existing security 
infrastructures. To be effectively applicable, a further 
transformation step into a given IdM product is missing. 
 
A further approach to model-driven security is given by 
[13]. The authors suggest a development process that 
combines platform-independent models based on OMG 
MOF [14], one for system design with another one 
concerning security aspects. Additionally, a tool is 
presented to transform the platform-independent 
authorization models into a platform-specific 
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representation for JEE and .NET components. They 
discuss a generic methodology for integrating security 
aspects into software development processes, but an 
employable instantiation of this approach for use in the 
Web service domain is not presented neither for the 
system design metamodel nor the security design 
language. Moreover, MOF-based metamodeling is a 
heavyweight extension of UML in the sense that it 
requires superior competences from security architects 
and lacks tool support. Furthermore, it is complicated to 
enhance the policy model towards Web service domain, 
especially to consider Web service invocation parameters. 
Additionally, the transformation rules presented are very 
specific to the integrated security models of JEE and 
.NET platform. A transformation to a loosely-coupled 
IdM product is somewhat more complicated as policy 
models are very different - a fact that is not addressed. 
 
3.  Web Services Access Control Markup  
     Language (WSACML) 
 
In this section we present Web Services Access Control 
Markup Language (WSACML), an XML-based language 
for the definition of access control policies for Web 
services. WSACML policies are independent from the 
IdM product which is used later, so they relate to the 
platform-independent model (PIM) of MDA. They build 
the first step for model-driven policy development. Using 
platform-independent policies allows for an abstraction of 
the highly technical representation inside the conrecte 
IdM products. WSACML extends our domain-specific 
conceptual access control metamodel for Web service-
oriented architecture as defined in [5] towards a concrete 
language. First we give an overview of the relevant sets 
and relations for access control policies in Web service-
oriented architecture. 
 
The objects to be protected in WSOA are Web service 
operations provided by atomic Web services or 
compositions. As their interfaces are technically the same, 
their access control policies can be handled similarly. 
Following the WSOA paradigm, a mapping from business 
processes towards Web services covering the IT-
supported parts takes place. Taking access control for 
Web services into consideration, we focus on so-called 
usage contexts of a Web service. From a business 
perspective a usage context directly relates to the 
invocation of a Web service during a concrete business 
process. A usage context describes which subjects (users 
or user agents) should have access to specific objects to 
accomplish their tasks or to meet other business 
requirements. 
 
A subject, e.g. a human user or a self-acting service, is 
defined by a collection of various subject attributes 
forming its digital identity. Considering just the subject’s 
business role does not scale with a constantly growing 
number of fine-grained Web services as argued in [9]. 
Furthermore, role-based access control is currently one of 
the most relevant concepts in enterprise level access 
control systems and it is strongly related to business 
process modeling. As practical experience shows, the 
mapping of business roles to system roles is always 
cumbersome. Our approach allows a business role to be 
represented either by a specific subject attribute carrying 
the role or it can be mapped to a role-specific set of 
subject attributes. 
 
The signature of a Web service operation aggregates 
several parameters, input parameters as well as output 
parameters. Constraining input parameters in 
dependency to a usage context enables fine-grained 
access control. This allows for instance the comparison 
between input parameters and attributes of the calling 
subject. An example for the checking of input parameters 
is given in the case study. Besides subject attributes and 
input parameters, constraints on environment attributes 
like time or location are also relevant to describe usage 
contexts and to make access control decisions. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Abstract Syntax of WSACML 
 
In figure 2 the abstract syntax of WSACML is depicted as 
an UML class diagram. The top-level element Policy is 
identified by its attribute Name and bound to an object by 
its attribute ServiceOperationBinding referencing a Web 
service operation as listed in the service registry. 
Furthermore, it defines a RuleSelectionAlgorithm 
describing what is done if more than one Rule is 
applicable. Deny-overrides implies that explicit 
prohibitions (deny-rules) have precedence over 
permissions (permit-rules). First-applicable is another 
algorithm which determines the first matching Rule of a 
Policy to define the result of an access control decision. 
 
A Policy is an ordered list of Rules (cf. to 
RuleSeclectionAlgorithm) which themselves have an 
identifying Name and an Effect. The Effect describes what 
happens if a Rule is applicable. Most common Effects are 
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Permit and Deny. A Rule aggregates several Assertions 
and is applicable if all of its Assertions evaluate to true. 
An Assertion is a predicate that requires two arguments. It 
combines two variables or a variable and a constant value 
using an AssertionFunction like equal, unequal, greater-
than-equal etc. To reflect the different entities that 
participate in an access context, variables are divided into 
four categories SubjectAttributes, ObjectAttributes, 
InputParameters and EnvironmentAttributes. WSACML 
allows that two variables are treated as arguments of 
Assertions. This enables for instance comparing an 
InputParameter of a service invocation with 
SubjectAttributes of the calling subject. A Rule’s Effect is 
only enforced if the Rule is applicable, which means that 
all of its Assertions are evaluated to true. If a Rule is not 
applicable, it implies that the Web service’s usage context 
does not match and that the subject is not authorized. 
 
Since a WSACML Policy is simply a pointer to concrete 
Rules, the administrative advantage of re-using Rules 
within Policies of other Web services is featured. If 
another Web service is deployed which is used in similar 
usage contexts, its Policy can be built from existing Rules. 
Additionally, a Policy of an existing Web service that is 
required to be accessed in another usage context is just 
extended by an additional Rule which covers the new 
Assertions. If the access requirements of an existing usage 
context change, only the appropriate Rule needs to be 
updated to adapt the Policies of all Web service 
operations associated with that usage context. The Policy 
of a Web service composition needs to include all 
Policies of the Web services operations it does invoke by 
all means. This allows for a pre-checking as the first step 
in a Web service composition and may reduce the need 
for roll-back operations. 
 
We use XML as the concrete syntax for WSACML, so 
the abstract syntax depicted in figure 2 has to be 
transformed to XML Schema (XSD). [15] describes a 
general way of mapping. The transformation maps UML 
classes to XSD complex types, UML attributes to XSD 
attributes and UML aggregations to XSD sequences. 
Policy and Rule classes were stereotyped with <<root>> 
to generate XSD top-level elements. Namespaces were 
retightened manually, as well as constraints like the 
restricted occurrence of variables and constants as child 
nodes of an assertion. 
 
It is important to recognize that WSACML only gives the 
structure of the language but does not give the vocabulary 
in the sense of the concrete names of the attributes of 
subjects, objects, parameters and environment that are 
available to set up access control policies. The vocabulary 
depends on the given business and IT environment and 
needs to be created in advance. It contains the information 
about all relevant business objects and can be enhanced at 
anytime. In our case study in section 5 we present a 
snapshot of an exemplary vocabulary. 
4.  Deriving Platform-Specific Policy Meta 
     models 
 
After having defined a platform-independent policy 
model, we show in this section how a policy metamodel 
for an existing security infrastructure can be refactored 
exemplarily treating CA eTrust SiteMinder [16] being a 
state-of-the-art IdM suite. Subsequently we show how a 
model-to-model transformation is utilized to generate 
platform-specific policies from WSACML ones. 
 
4.1  CA eTrust SiteMinder as a specific IdM Platform 
 
SiteMinder is an enterprise-level policy-based Web access 
management platform. Web agents are hooked into 
distributed Web servers and application servers and act as 
policy enforcement points. They intercept access requests, 
forward them to the centralized policy decision point and 
enforce access decisions. Policies can be authored via a 
Web-based administration applet or using a given Java-
based policy API. Policies are maintained in an LDAP-
based policy store, which was the starting point for 
obtaining the subset of SiteMinder’s policy model 
relevant for authorization. Figure 3 depicts the platform-
specific abstract SiteMinder policy syntax. As there is 
neither an explicit definition nor a specification of 
SiteMinder’s backend policy model, we derived the 
semantics of objects and attributes by reverse engineering 
using the policy API and the policy design guide. 
 
 
Figure 3. Abstract Syntax of SiteMinder Policy Model 
 
Figure 3 shows the relevant SiteMinder’s object classes 
that are used to formulate authorization statements. In the 
SiteMinder model authorization is bound to resources by 
the attribute ResourceFilter which is part of the object 
SmRealm. SmRealm corresponds to a subset of an URL. 
The PolicyLink links a realm to a policy, called SmPolicy. 
SmPolicy allows for time- and location-based restrictions 
and directly links towards user filters, called 
SmUserPolicy. Authorized users are determined via 
SmUserPolicy objects which allow the definition of 
LDAP-based user filters. SmRule is the third element of 
the PolicyLink and determines whether an authorization 
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statement permits or denies access. Other attributes 
owned by the related object classes that are not shown 
here mainly contain configuration settings, e.g. for each 
SmUserPolicy a specific connection between a policy 
server and different user directories can be defined. 
 
To be usable for policy transformation, the SiteMinder 
UML diagram has to be transformed to an XSD schema 
as well by applying the same transformation as we did for 
the PIM described in the previous section. We ensured 
that classes and attributes are directly related to their 
policy API counterparts. When proceeding to deployment 
a policy import tool only needs to parse the XML-based 
SiteMinder policy and settings files and generate the 
appropriate SiteMinder objects forming the platform-
specific code (PSC). 
 
4.2  Defining PIM to PSM Transformation 
 
After defining the platform-independent and the platform-
specific model, these need to be linked via explicit 
transformation rules. Development of transformation rules 
between both policy models primarily consists of three 
steps: 
 
1. Provide abstract syntax trees for both input models and 
output models 
 
Since XSLT is selected as the transformation language, 
source and target trees are provided as XML schema 
(XSD). The abstract syntax for the source tree is provided 
by WSACML XSD (generated from figure 2) and the 
abstract syntax for the target tree is provided by 
SiteMinder XSD (generated from figure 3). 
 
2. Formulate conceptual transformation rules 
 
In this step concepts of PIM are to be mapped towards 
PSM. As both models can substantially differ the actual 
linking should be assisted by an expert of the PSM 
environment as this model is usually substantially more 
complicated to understand. First the transformation rules 
which are to be formalized in the next step are to be 
formulated on a conceptual basis. Mapping can be 
initiated by identifying semantically equivalent sub trees 
in both models which can be started at the root node. 
 
Table 1. Conceptual Transformation Rules 
Source:  
WSACML 
Transformation Target: 
SiteMinder 
Policy  SmRealm 
Rule/ 
@Effect 
Permit ? true  
Deny ? false 
SmRule/ 
@AllowAccess 
Assertion 
/Subject-
Attribute 
/@Name= 
role 
? ‘cn =’+ @Value + 
‘, ou = roles, dc = 
com’ 
?organizationalUnit 
?5 
?0 
smUserPolicy/ 
@FilterPath 
@FilterClass 
@PolicyRes. 
@PolicyFlags 
It is useful to work with rule patterns e.g. direct mapping, 
mapping with type cast, or restructuring rules. Examples 
of the three kinds of rules are shown in table 1. The first 
entry is a direct mapping of WSACML Policy elements to 
SiteMinder’s SmRealm. If semantics and structure are 
equivalent but types and names differ, transformation 
involves type casting and renaming. An example for type 
casting is the second rule in table 1. It does a mapping of 
String-typed attribute Effect of a WSACML Rule to the 
attribute AllowAccess of Boolean type owned by 
SiteMinder SmRule. 
 
The third example in table 1 is about a complex 
restructuring rule. SiteMinder does not explicitly support 
WSACML’s concept of Assertions. Required attribute 
statements are distributed over several LDAP objects 
combined to a SiteMinder policy. The example shows 
how to map an assertion concerning a concrete subject 
attribute from WSACML’s model to SiteMinder’s model. 
It takes the value of the subject attribute “role” and 
converts it to a LDAP search expression. This affects the 
four attributes of SiteMinder’s smUserPolicy: FilterPath 
accepts an LDAP search expression, which is 
concatenated from “cn=” in case of 
SubjectAttribute/@Name=role and a literal derived from 
Constant/@Value and the remainder “ou=roles, dc=com”. 
FilterClass defines the object class of the directory object 
specified by FilterPath, here an LDAP object of type 
“organizationUnit”. PolicyResolution describes the 
relation between the directory object and the subject. In 
the actual case “5” indicates that the subject’s 
distinguished name is a member of the directory object 
(organizationalUnit). PolicyFlags’s value of “0” indicates 
that neither exclusion nor recursion due to nested groups 
is required by the policy. 
 
3. Formalize rules by mapping them to concrete 
transformation technology 
 
SiteMinder’s view on policy and rule elements is different 
from the view presented by WSACML, i.e. SiteMinder 
policies are user centric whereas WSACML policies are 
resource-centric. So a WSACML Policy is mapped to 
SmRealm and a Rule is mapped to both SmRule and 
SmPolicy which are linked together by PolicyLink. 
 
In figure 4 we show an exemplary excerpt of the 
formalization of the conceptual transformation rules using 
XSLT. It shows how to map the WSACML Rules to 
SiteMinder’s policy model. The XSLT-based 
transformation is applied when the XPath expression 
assigned to the attribute “match” is matched by a node or 
node set of the source tree. The transformation involves 
type casting from String-valued WSACML Rule/@Effect 
to Boolean-valued SiteMinder SmRule/@AllowAccess. 
The instruction <xsl:apply-templates> causes the XSLT 
processor to search for applicable transformation rules at 
this point. 
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<xsl:template match=„Rule">
<PolicyLink>
<SmRule>
<xsl:attribute name=„Name">
<xsl:value-of select='@Name'/>
</xsl:attribute>
<xsl:attribute name=„AllowAccess">
<xsl:value-of select="@Effect = 'permit'"/>
</xsl:attribute>
</SmRule>
<SmPolicy>
<xsl:attribute name=„Name">
<xsl:value-of select='@Name'/>
</xsl:attribute>
<xsl:apply-templates/>
</SmPolicy>
</PolicyLink>
</xsl:template>  
Figure 4. Exemplary XSLT Transformation Rule 
 
5.  Case Study 
 
An integration project at our university applies a WSOA-
based approach to encapsulate functionality of existing 
heterogeneous software systems at reusable Web services. 
These services are then to be composed following 
specified business processes. These processes are 
designed with UML use case and activity diagrams and 
are mapped to component and service diagrams [17]. 
 
student
counselor
ToRService
createToR
«usageContext»
StudentConsultation
«usageContext»
StudentSelfService
 
Figure 5. Associating Objects with Usage Contexts 
 
UML use case diagrams which abstractly describe the 
functional requirements build the starting point of a Web 
service development project. Access control aspects as 
non-functional requirements are integrated into such 
analysis models by enhancing the model semantics using 
stereotypes. In figure 5, we show our enhancement adding 
so-called “usage contexts”. The given example addresses 
a service providing a transcript of records (ToR). It is 
offered by a Web service called ToRService at the 
operation “createToR”. This functionality can be accessed 
by different roles in different usage contexts. A student 
may get access for self-service and is then allowed to get 
his ToR only. In contrast a counselor is allowed to access 
the ToR of all students. 
 
Before being able to specify these usage contexts as 
WSACML Rules that build the WSACML Policy for the 
“createToR” Web service operation, the concrete 
vocabulary has to be defined. According to our 
metamodel depicted in section 3, four areas have to be 
covered: attributes of subjects are to be derived from the 
user repository, object attributes are an aggregation of 
existing metadata, input parameters are to be derived from 
the existing Web service interfaces and environment 
attributes are to be specified according to the project’s 
needs. This vocabulary is not fixed but can be flexibly 
extended by new attributes as this does not affect existing 
WSACML Rules. The attributes provide the vocabulary 
for the access control language WSACML. Figure 6 
exemplarily depicts a reduced view of our WSACML 
vocabulary. 
 
 
Figure 6. Exemplary WSACML Vocabulary 
 
From the enhanced use case diagram, a WSACML Policy 
is generated for each use case corresponding to a Web 
service operation. While the aggregation of all usage 
contexts defines the overall WSACML Policy of a Web 
service operation, each usage context maps to an 
individual WSACML Rule. This Rule puts together all 
necessary Assertions that must hold for the Rule to be 
applicable. It sets up on the vocabulary of attributes as 
defined before. 
 
<Policy Name=„createToR_policy" 
ServiceOperationBinding=„ToRService/createToR“
RuleSelectionAlgorithm=„first-applicable “>
<RuleRef>StudentSelfService</RuleRef>
<RuleRef>StudentConsultation</RuleRef>
</Policy>
<Rule Name=„StudentSelfService“ Effect=„permit“>
<Assertion AssertionFunction="equal">
<SubjectAttribute Name="role" />
<Constant Value="student" />
</Assertion>
<Assertion AssertionFunction="equal">
<SubjectAttribute Name=„identifier“ />
<InputParameter Name="matriculation" />
</Assertion>
</Rule>
<Rule Name=„StudentConsultation“ Effect=„permit“>
<Assertion AssertionFunction="equal">
<SubjectAttribute Name="role" />
<Constant Value="counselor" />
</Assertion>
</Rule>  
Figure 7. Exemplary WSACML Policy / Rules 
 
In figure 7 an exemplary WSACML Policy and 
corresponding Rules are depicted. The Policy has the 
name “createToR_policy” and is bound to the Web 
service operation “ToRService/createToR” as specified 
during service design. From the two usage contexts 
StudentSelfService and StudentConsultation as depicted in 
the enhanced UML use case diagram, two WSACML 
Rules with the corresponding names are derived. Using 
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“first-applicable” as RuleSelectionAlgorithm implies the 
first matching rule defines the Effect of the Policy. 
StudentSelfService contains two Assertions that need to be 
evaluated to true so that the Rule can be applied. First, the 
attribute “role” of the calling subject needs to be 
“student”, second the subject’s attribute “identifier” has to 
be identical to the input parameter with the name 
“matriculation” of the service invocation. To match the 
usage context of a student consultation process, the 
calling subject needs to have the attribute “role” with a 
value of “counselor”. In case of an access control request, 
the rule StudentSelfService is checked first. If the subject 
attribute role does not match, this Rule’s assertions do not 
evaluate to true so the Rule is not applicable. The next 
Rule is evaluated until one is applicable. Then this Rule’s 
Effect defines the overall access decision. Keep in mind 
that this WSACML Policy consisting of two Rules is 
completely independent from a concrete IdM product 
which we will consider in the next section. 
 
<SmRealm Name=‘createToR_policy’
ResourceFilter=‘ToRService/createToR’>
<PolicyLink>
<SmRule Name=‘StudentConsultation’
AllowAccess=‘true’ />
<SmPolicy Name=‘StudentConsultation’>
<SmUserPolicy
FilterPath=‘cn=counselor, ou=roles, dc=com’
FilterClass=‘organizationalUnit’
PolicyResoultion=‘5’
PolicyFlags=‘0’ />
</SmPolicy>
</PolicyLink>
</SmRealm>  
Figure 8. Exemplary SiteMinder Policy (PSM) 
 
At present we use SiteMinder as the policy decision point 
in our IdM architecture. By using WSACML for policy 
specification and transformations to SiteMinder, we are 
not limited to this product. When deploying a Web 
service, its WSACML Rules according to its Policy are 
collected and the transformation is applied. We use the 
XSLT processor of Oracle JDeveloper. Figure 8 shows a 
SiteMinder policy that has been transformed from the 
WSACML policy in figure 7 using the transformation 
depicted in figure 4. With the PSM policies then 
conforming in a structural and syntactical way to 
SiteMinder’s policy model we developed a Java-based 
policy import tool which uses SiteMinder’s policy API for 
the final import to its policy store. 
 
6.  Conclusion and Further Work 
 
In this paper we presented Web Services Access Control 
Markup Language (WSACML) which allows modeling of 
access control policies for Web services at design time. It 
is platform-independent related to the IdM product that is 
applied at runtime. We designed both an access control 
model and a concrete language and showed how to 
refactor an appropriate model of an existing IdM product 
exemplarily considering CA eTrust SiteMinder. We 
illustrated how to apply our approach in a case study in a 
WSOA-based integration project. 
 
Our next steps are further work on how access control 
policies for Web service compositions relate to the 
policies of the atomic ones. Additionally, we will focus 
on policy lifecycle management. 
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